What drives vertical fiscal interactions? Evidence from the 1980 Crude Oil Windfall Act by Pérez Sebastián, Fidel & Raveh, Ohad
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2817039 
What Drives Vertical Fiscal Interactions? Evidence from the 1980
Crude Oil Windfall Act
Fidel Perez-Sebastiany
U. Alicante and U. Hull
Ohad Ravehz
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
October 2018
Abstract
In economies with multi-level governments, why would a change in the scal rule of a gov-
ernment in one level lead to a scal response by a government in a di¤erent level? The literature
focused primarily on the standard common-pool problem, while giving little attention to the
potential role of complementarity or substitutability (CS) between the public goods supplied
by the two governments. This paper lls this gap by focusing on the latter channel. First, we
illustrate its potential key role in determining the sign of the vertical reaction through a generic
model of vertical scal interactions. Second, we propose a novel strategy for identifying it, by
considering an empirical design that connes the common-pool channel to specic locations. We
implement this design through a quasi-natural experiment: the 1980 U.S. Crude Oil Windfall
Act, which increased federal tax collections from sale of crude oil, thereby a¤ecting the tax base
of oil rich states specically. This latter feature enables attributing the vertical scal reactions
of the remaining states to the CS channel. Following this strategy, via a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
approach, we decompose the sources of the vertical scal reactions arising from this federal tax
change and nd that those attributed to the CS channel: (i) account for approximately 38% of
the overall vertical scal response; (ii) point at complementarity between state and federal public
goods, most notably in transportation and welfare expenditures; (iii) are manifested primarily
via changes in statessales and income taxation.
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1 Introduction
In multi-level governments such as federations, where each level acts as a separate scal authority,
a change in the scal rule of a government in one level may create a scal response by a government
in a di¤erent level, thus creating vertical scal interactions. This issue has taken a central role in
the scal federalism literature, with recent studies examining the various theoretical and empirical
aspects of it. One foundational question that emerges from this literature relates to the underlying
sources: what drives vertical scal interactions? Previous seminal studies focused primarily on
the standard common-pool problem: taxing a shared tax base, a change in the tax rate of one
government level a¤ects the tax base of the other, leading to a scal response by the latter.1 The
literature, however, gave little attention to the potential role of an additional factor: state-federal
complementarities or substitutabilities (henceforth, CS).2 When one government changes its scal
policy, the other may respond due to complementarities or substitutabilities between the public
goods supplied by the two governments. In this paper we ll this gap by focusing on the latter
channel. Specically, we illustrate its role in determining the sign of the vertical scal response,
and provide empirical evidence for its sign, magnitude, and relative importance compared to the
common-pool mechanism, through a specic empirical design.
The notion of state-federal complementarities in public goods dates back to the fundamental
allocative principle in scal federalism of scal equivalence (e.g. Inman and Rubinfeld (1997), and
Olson (1969)), motivating the coexistence of multiple levels of jurisdictions; governments provide
public goods based on correspondence between the geographical boundaries of the jurisdictions and
those of the benets derived from the supplied public goods, potentially leading to complementary
public good provision between the two levels of governments.3 An opposing school of thought, how-
1See Boadway and Keen (1996), Boadway, Marchand, and Vigneault (1996), Dahlby and Wilson (2003), Keen
(1998), and Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002). In e¤ect, this channel refers to the cohabitation of the tax base. While
receiving various titles in the literature, we follow Dahlby (1996) and refer to it as the common-pool channel given
its reminiscence to the more general common property resource problem.
2Keen (1998) discusses the option of CS-driven vertical scal externalities, but focuses his analysis on the com-
monality of tax bases. Dahlby (1996) considers the role of state-federal CS e¤ects within the context of designing a
system of intergovernmental grants, without analyzing their role in the vertical response. Hafer and Landa (2007)
model the relation between federal and state public goods in a formal federalism framework; however, they do not
consider vertical scal externalities. More generally, the related theoretical literature remains agnostic about the
role of the relationship between state and federal public goods. It either employs a general utility function with no
assumptions over the interaction between state and federal public goods, or uses separable demands while excluding
one of the types of public goods from the set of preferences.
3Evidence on the so-called Flypaper E¤ect support this. Examining state-level spending responses to federal
grants, various studies estimate that an inow of federal grants can increase state spending by a factor higher than
1 (see Gramlich (1977), Hines and Thaler (1995), and Inman (2008) for surveys). This crowding-in evidence can be
interpreted as indirectly pointing at potential complementarity between federal and state spending. We say indirectly
because these studies focus mainly on unconditional grants, and hence primarily on the dynamics of windfall-based
income e¤ects rather than complementarities in public good provision.
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ever, highlights the possibility of substitutability between the di¤erent types of public goods (e.g.
Knight (2002)).4 Put together, the literature suggests that while the evidence on the relationship
is inconclusive, its existence is an applicable feature of the data, making it a potential driver of
vertical scal relations.
To better illustrate the possible role of state-federal CS relationships in vertical scal relations,
as well as their interaction with the common-pool channel, let us think of the following hypothetical
motivational example: a federal government increases its tax rates over labor income to nance
a new inter-state highway, leading to a negative labor supply shock. On one hand, this creates
a common-pool problem as it erodes statestax revenues from labor income. This, in turn, may
lead state governments to increase their tax rates to be able to maintain the pre-shock level of
public goods.5 On the other hand, however, states may also wish to invest in complementary
infrastructure, such as side roads, to properly connect their residents to the newly built inter-state
highway. In this case they may also raise their tax revenues via increases in tax rates, yet this time
due to a complementarity e¤ect.
Obviously, the example assumes state-federal complementarities, making the common-pool and
CS channels go in the same direction. In such a case the overall vertical tax reaction is positive.
However, under a di¤erent scenario where the state and federal public goods are substitutes, for
instance if the federal government invests directly in statesside roads rather than in an inter-state
highway, the two mechanisms would go in opposite directions. Indeed, with su¢ cient substitutabil-
ity the overall vertical tax reaction may be negative. This highlights the potential key role that the
nature of the CS relationship may take in vertical interactions.
Illustrating this analytically is our rst objective. Our second objective is building an empirical
design that enables identifying the CS-driven vertical scal reactions. Empirically disentangling
statesvertical scal responses triggered by eroded tax bases from those occurring through the CS
channel is a challenging task. To the best of our knowledge, this paper makes a rst attempt to
do so, through a specic design that controls the boundaries of the common-pool e¤ect by relating
it to an immobile tax base: natural resources a potentially signicant source of income with an
inherent, geographically entrenched, immobility.
With these goals in mind, we construct a federalism model of vertical scal interactions, mo-
4More generally, the type of association observed, whether complementarity or substitutability, may depend on
the type of scal shock, its characteristics, and the expenditure categories a¤ected by it. For instance, some federal
spending programs are dependent on state-level matching, creating complementarity by construction.
5Notably, the sign of the change depends on various factors such as, for instance, the elasticity of demand for the
taxed good (Keen (1998)). We, thus, assume for the sake of the example that labor demand is relatively inelastic, and
that the optimal level of public good provision did not change following the federal tax change due to, for example,
a change in private consumption. Later, when studying this e¤ect analytically, we show the latter may indeed push
the outcome in the opposite direction.
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tivated by the frameworks of Keen (1998), Besley and Rosen (1998), and Keen and Kotsogiannis
(2002). In the model, the level of government spending is chosen endogenously. To nance the
budget, federal and state governments tax several shared tax bases. Unlike previous literature, the
role of this cohabitation is studied in detail along with the role of the degree of complementarity
(and equivalently, substitutability) between the public goods supplied by each government. This
setting, which incorporates both the common-pool and CS channels into the same framework, en-
ables studying how the two interact given a federal scal shock and state-heterogeneity in the tax
bases.6
The analysis delivers two main predictions. First, the common-pool and CS e¤ects can be, in
general, positive or negative and push in the same or opposite directions. However, when standard
functional forms are introduced in the model and specic tax cases analyzed, the common-pool and
CS channels become negative and positive, respectively. As a consequence, if the complementarity
between federal and state public goods is su¢ ciently high, statestax rates increase with an increase
in the federal tax rate. This result illustrates analytically the key role that the CS channel can
take in determining the sign of the vertical tax reaction, motivating our focus on it. Second, an
increase in the federal tax on a commodity that is immobile and only available in some states, like
natural resources, erodes the tax base of states that own it, thus limiting the common-pool channel
to these areas. Importantly, under such circumstances, scal reactions coming from the remaining
states can be attributed to the CS channel, hence enabling its identication.
Following the latter insight, we study a quasi-natural experiment that mimics the analytical
design: the 1980 U.S. Crude Oil Windfall Act (henceforth, COWA), under which excise taxes over
the sale of crude oil increased based on a pre-set formula dependent on the international price of
crude oil. Through this act, which was eventually repealed in 1988, the federal government collected
approximately 80$ billion over a period of 7 years (1980-1986) with an aim to assist low-income
households, fund mass transit, and invest in the exploration of new energy sources; objectives
that we show were largely met. Notably, all of the tax receipts were essentially collected from
American oil producers, hence eroding the tax base of, and conning the common-pool mechanism
to, oil rich states specically. Controlling for factor reallocation, the vertical scal reactions of the
remaining states can then be attributed, as the theory suggests, to the CS channel, thus enabling
the assessment of its sign, magnitude, and relative importance.
Employing an annual-based state-level panel covering the period of 1963-2007, we examine
statesheterogeneous scal reactions to the federal COWA tax collections, across levels of oil abun-
6We focus our discussion on top-to-bottom shocks given the nature of the quasi-natural experiment that we
examine.
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dance. The treatment e¤ect for this analysis is constructed in two stages. In the rst stage we
estimate the tted values of state-specic regressions of the COWA tax collections on the federal
expenditures in each state (net of transfers and direct payments to individuals). In the second stage
we merge these tted values together. This, in turn, yields a measure of the COWA-driven federal
expenditures in each state during the treatment years (1980-1986). We then employ this mea-
sure in the analysis, via a di¤erence-in-di¤erences methodology. The identication strategy rests
on the plausibly exogenous nature of the treatment (COWA-based) and treatment group (subset
of states with geographically-based natural endowments), as well as on a likely common-trend in
non-treatment years. We elaborate on these key points in the empirical part.
Following this methodology we estimate the vertical scal reaction of each state-group (oil-
rich vs. oil-poor) to the federal tax shock, and use the estimates to decompose the vertical tax
responses to their two main sources: common-pool and CS. We nd that the portion of the responses
attributed to the CS channel: (i) account for approximately 38% of the overall vertical scal
response; (ii) point at complementarity between state and federal public goods, most notably in
transportation and welfare expenditures; (iii) are manifested primarily via changes in statessales
and income taxation. We show that the main results are robust to various controls, specications,
sample restrictions, as well as resource abundance and tax measures.
The paper relates to three strands of literature. First, the empirical literature on vertical
tax externalities, including Besley and Rosen (1998), Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2007),
Esteller-More and Sole-Olle (2001), Fredriksson and Mamum (2008), Goodspeed (2000), Hayashi
and Boadway (2001), Hoyt (2001) and Reingewertz (2018), which examine the e¤ects of various
federal tax shocks on di¤erent tax bases over multiple time periods and countries. The ndings
of these studies are jointly inconclusive, providing opposing evidence on the sign of the vertical
tax externality. Importantly, their estimates include both the common-pool and CS components,
without distinguishing between them. We contribute to this literature by illustrating the poten-
tial importance of the CS channel, showing that its sign and magnitude may determine the sign
of the vertical externality. This, in turn, may reconcile their opposing ndings, calling for the
concurrent consideration of both mechanisms in future related empirical work. In addition, by dis-
entangling the two channels, we provide more direct evidence on the common-pool-driven vertical
scal externalities, nding that they are negative in our experiment.
Second, the literature on scal competition (see Wilson (1999), Wilson (2015), and Wilson
and Wildasin (2004) for a synthesis of this vast literature). The majority of studies focus on
competition in tax rates; however, competition may occur in other scal instruments. As noted by
Wildasin (1988), when competition is not perfect this distinction may yield di¤erent outcomes, with
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potentially important implications. Our results, primarily via the notable importance of the CS
channel in vertical reactions, support the view that tax rates may adjust to changes in expenditures,
thus highlighting the relevance of distinguishing between these forms of scal competition.
Third, the literature on the optimal number of government layers. Since the seminal work
of Tiebout (1956), a body of literature has emerged stressing the benets of having overlapping
governments based on e¢ ciency grounds (Oates (1972) and Qian and Roland (1998)). Conversely,
other studies critique this view, arguing that it does not account for inter-governmental strategic
behaviors that may lead to ine¢ ciencies via scal common-pool problems (Berry (2008), Knight
(2006) and Poterba and von Hagen (1999)). We contribute to this literature by showing that even
when inter-dependencies among di¤erent layers are accounted for, scal comovements between
di¤erent layers may be e¢ cient due to complementarities in public goods. Moreover, since these
studies do not account for the CS channel, our results suggest that they may be over-estimating
the said ine¢ ciencies.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 undertakes the
empirical analysis, outlining the empirical design, data, and results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Analytical Framework
In this section we lay out a simple analytical framework to present the role of state-federal CS
relationships in vertical scal interactions, alongside the standard common-pool mechanism. In
addition, the model illustrates the type of federal tax shock that enables identifying the CS channel
and its relative importance in the vertical interactions; an important feature that will serve to
motivate the design of the empirical analysis in the next section.
There could be several formalizations that deliver our main insights. We adopt the simplest
one that allows studying the vertical externalities arising from the interrelated tax-setting behavior
of the federal and state governments in a federation. We adopt a generic framework that follows
the work of Keen (1998), and Besley and Rosen (1998). In particular, we extend Keen (1998)s
theoretical analysis to allow for multiple tax rates and study in detail the di¤erent e¤ects that drive
vertical externalities. For this, we only need to specify the consumption side of the model. More
specic cases that incorporate particular functional forms and a production side of the economy,
and focus on the tax rates analyzed later in the empirical section  namely, severance, income,
sales, and corporate taxes are presented in the Appendix.
Consider a nation composed of a central (federal) government, and Z scally autonomous states,
each with its own government and populated by a xed mass of consumers of size one.7 Let us focus
7Making labor mobile should not a¤ect our main results, provided that we are interested in disentangling the
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on state s. Governments can impose taxes on N commodities and/or production inputs to nance
the supply of public goods. The state operates under a balanced budget so that total revenues
equal total spending, that is,
t0sbs = gs; (1)
where t is the vector of tax rates ft1s; ::; tNsg, b is the vector of tax bases fb1s; ::; bNsg, with bjs  0
and tjs 2 [0; 1), and 0 denotes transposed.
Similarly, the federal government imposes a collection of tax rates T on a vector of tax bases B
to nance a federal public good G such that
T 0B
Z
= G: (2)
Budget constraint (2) says that all states receive the same amountG. The model, therefore, assumes
partial equalization by the federal government.8 This phenomenon stands at the heart of our main
mechanism as it enables the occurrence of a scal asymmetry across regions. Such asymmetry is
observed in the vast majority, if not all, of federations.9
Importantly, both levels of government can co-occupy or cohabit some tax bases so that b is
contained in B. Examples are the income tax base and the corporate tax base. Other taxes, on
the other hand, like the ones on sales and property (for example, in the case of the U.S.), are only
imposed by state governments. Nevertheless, even if there is no direct cohabitation of the same
tax base, federal taxes can also a¤ect the tax base of other types of state taxes. For example,
federal severance taxes a¤ect oil rmsprots, and therefore also state sales taxes collected from
the consumption spending carried out by the oil rmsowners.
Assume that the state government is benevolent.10 We concentrate on the competitive equilib-
rium in which the relatively-small state s internalizes the domestic determinants of the tax base,
but takes the behavior of other states and the federal administration as given.11 More specically,
sources of the vertical interactions. We discuss further implications of this assumption in the empirical part.
8 In that sense, we abstract from explicitly modelling a federal transfer mechanism, which would not add further
insights to the current framework.
9Previous studies documented large cross-state di¤erences, even in those federations with large-scale equalization
payment schemes. Boadway (2006) discusses the case of Canada, a federation with a major redistributive scheme.
Partial equalization is as well observed in various developed and developing federations (Martinez-Vazquez and Searle
(2007)) and in the OECD (Blochliger and Charbit (2008)).
10The governments objective, within a tax competition context, can be expressed in several forms. Other models
consider a leviathan government (Brennan and Buchanan (1980)) or a semi self-interest one (Cai and Treisman
(2005)). We comment on this issue later in the section.
11We focus on the competitive equilibrium. Notice however that the key is the assumption that states take the
behavior of all other governments as given. This looks sensible to us if we think of states as small economies. Then,
an alternative focus on the Nash equilibrium or considering the federal government as a Stackelberg leader should
not have any signicant impact on our qualitative results.
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state s chooses the level of tax rates to maximize the representative-consumers utility as follows:
max
ts
fu(cs; gs; G) = v(c) +  (gs; G)g (3)
subject to equations (1), (2), and
cs = c(t
0
s; T
0); (4)
where cs is the aggregated value of the consumption bundle in state s.
The consumption function c(t0s; T 0) is decreasing in each of the tax rates, in accordance with the
notion that higher taxes reduce the spending capacity of households. The functions v() and  ()
are, in turn, increasing and strictly concave. In addition, the cross-partial derivation of  () can
be larger than or equal to zero. Notice that if this cross derivative is strictly positive, the public
goods gs and G are complements. Following the initial motivational example, gs may complement
G when, for instance, the federal government builds cross-state transportation infrastructure within
state s for which the state government would like to connect via further local infrastructure built
using its own budget. We assume for simplicity that  () is the same across states.12
The rst order conditions (FOCs) for this problem provide the optimal decisions. Focusing on
tax rate tjs, the related FOC is
@v(cs)
@tjs
+
@ (gs; G)
@gs
@gs
@tjs
= 0: (5)
The rst term in the left hand side (LHS) gives the decline in the marginal utility of consumption
motivated by an increase in tax rate tjs. The second summand captures its marginal benet, due
to the increase in the supply of the public good gs permitted by a larger tax collection. At the
optimum, the marginal benet and the marginal cost must be equalized.
A main goal of our analysis is understanding how a change in a federal tax rate  say Ti 
modies the optimal state tax rate tjs. Applying the implicit function theorem to expression (5)
obtains
dtjs
dTi
=
@2v(cs)
@tjs@Ti
+ @ (gs;G)@gs
@2gs
@tjs@Ti
+ @
2 (gs;G)
@gs@Ti
@gs
@tjs
  @@tjs
h
@v(cs)
@tjs
+ @ (gs;G)@gs
@gs
@tjs
i : (6)
Note that the denominator of (6) is equal to minus the second derivative with respect to the
decision variable in maximization problem (3) evaluated at the maximum, which means that the
denominator is always positive.
Therefore, the change in tjs induced by a change in Ti depends exclusively on the impact of
12We discuss further implications of this assumption in the empirical part. As will be evident, it does not a¤ect
the identication strategy.
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the federal tax on the terms that composed FOC (5). In the numerator of (6) we can identify
three di¤erent e¤ects of Ti: (i) a marginal utility e¤ect given by @2v(cs)=(@tjs@Ti); (ii) a marginal
revenue e¤ect captured by @2gs=(@tjs@Ti) times @ (gs; G)=@gs; and (iii) a public-good CS e¤ect,
given by @gs=@tjs multiplied by the impact of the variation of Ti on the weight @ (gs; G)=@gs.13
The marginal utility and marginal revenue e¤ects are closely interrelated, because most taxes
have a direct impact on both government revenues and householdsspending capacity. More specif-
ically, when a federal tax rate rises, it reduces the state tax base because of cohabitation. The
decline in the tax base further reduces both the state government revenue and the consumers in-
come. Given this, we refer to the join marginal-utility/marginal-revenue e¤ect as the common-pool
mechanism.14
The above denition of the public-good CS e¤ect implies that if the state behaved, instead,
as a leviathan that simply maximizes revenue, the CS e¤ect would not play any role. Notice that
maximizing revenues only requires the equalization of the marginal revenue to zero. Therefore,
evidence in favor of a role of the CS e¤ect can be also interpreted as evidence against a pure
leviathan behavior.
Equation (6) has no clear sign because the three summands in its numerator can be positive
or negative. Starting with the rst one, we can decompose the marginal utility as @v(cs)=@cs
times @cs=@tjs. The decline in consumption induced by a higher federal tax rate tends to decrease
@cs=@tjs but increases the marginal utility because @v(cs)=@cs < 0. Thus the overall change in
@v(cs)=@tjs is ambiguous.
Moving to the marginal revenue, the term @ (gs; G)=@gs is strictly positive. This implies
that the sign of the second summand in the numerator of equation (6) is exclusively given by
@2gs=@tjs@Ti. Employing the state government budget constraint, expression (1), and taking into
13Let us compare these e¤ects with the ones analyzed by Besley and Rosen (1998) and Keen (1998). Like us, Besley
and Rosen (1998) consider an array of state and federal taxes. However, they mainly look at the state response to a
federal tax change when the goal is to raise a xed amount of revenue. From their setup, Besley and Rosen (1998)
describe a deadweight loss e¤ect similar to (i), and a revenue e¤ect and a tax-related CS e¤ect that jointly can
resemble (ii). The model presented by Keen (1998) is, on the other hand, closer to ours. Specically, in this model
federal tax rates may a¤ect the chosen level of gs. Nonetheless, unlike us, he focuses on a single instrument to raise
revenue and on the e¤ects related to the co-occupation of the tax base (common-pool). Therefore, neither of these
two papers disentangles the public-spending CS e¤ect from the common-pool one.
14A clearer way to show that the e¤ect that works through the marginal utility can also be considered to be part
of the common-pool channel is, for example, by looking at the state sales (or consumption) tax. In this scenario,
an increase in the federal rate could reduce consumption expenditure, and therefore state tax revenues. This case is
analyzed in the Appendix. Importantly, it leads to the same main insights.
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account that a change in the state tax rate tjs can modify several tax bases, we can write:
@2gs
@tjs@Ti
=
@
@Ti
8><>:bjs 1  ebjs(tjs)+
NX
v=1
v 6=j
bvs
tvs
tjs
ebvs(tjs)
9>=>; ; (7)
where ebjs(tjs) denotes the elasticity of the tax base bjs to its own tax rate tjs, and ebvs(tjs)
represents the cross elasticity of the tax base bvs to the tax rate tjs.
Hence, the sign of the marginal revenue e¤ect depends on how the federal tax rate a¤ects the
elasticities. This is the same insight as the one o¤ered by Keen (1998) but extended to multiple
possibly interrelated taxes. As a corollary, because both the marginal utility and the marginal
revenue can increase or decrease when there is a federal tax-rate shock, the common-pool e¤ect can
be positive or negative.
Finally, we look at the CS channel. The sign of the term @2 (gs; G)=(@gs@Ti) will be positive
when the two public goods are complements i.e., if @2 (gs; G)=(@gs@G) > 0 because @gs=@Ti  0
and @G=@Ti > 0 always.15 On the other hand, the sign of @2 (gs; G)=(@gs@Ti) can be positive or
negative if gs and G are substitutes. The direction of the CS mechanism also depends on the
sign of @gs=@tjs. We know that this derivative is given by the terms within the curly brackets in
expression (7). Hence, the sign of the CS e¤ect depends on the elasticity of substitution between
gs and G, as well as on the tax-rate elasticities of the tax bases. If, for example, the public goods
are complements and gs rises with tjs then the CS e¤ect is positive.
The common-pool and g-G CS e¤ects are, therefore, both at work and can be positive or
negative. This highlights a key point of the analysis: the CS channel may play an important role
in understanding the sign and magnitude of the vertical tax reaction, shedding light on a point of
disagreement in the literature. However, given that we can not pin down the sign with certainty,
the magnitude and direction of each of these two forces become an empirical issue. Next, we obtain
results that allow o¤ering theoretical foundations to disentangle the two mechanisms.
Suppose that the federal tax rate Ti is imposed on a commodity available only in some states
but not in others. In the empirical analysis, this commodity is (immobile) oil reserves. This implies
that, only if state s owns the commodity, the variation in the state tax rate tjs will be driven by
the three e¤ects dened above. However, if this is not the case, a change in Ti will produce zero
variation in the marginal utility, marginal revenue, and state revenues that is, @2v(cs)=(@tjs@Ti),
15 In principle, the sign of @G=@Ti could be positive or negative because of the impact of Ti on the tax bases.
However, in terms of our model, more G is always good, and therefore, a benevolent federal government will raise Ti
only if it increases revenues and the supply of G.
9
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@2gs=(@tjs@Ti), and @gs=@Ti will be equal to zero. Consequently, expression (6) will become
dtjs
dTi
=

@2 (gs;G)
@gs@G
@G
@Ti

@gs
@tjs
  @@tjs
h
@v(cs)
@tjs
+ @ (gs;G)@gs
@gs
@tjs
i : (8)
Only revenues obtained by the federal government and the public good that it supplies will increase.
Importantly, expressions (6) and (8) suggests that it is possible to separate the CS from the
other e¤ects when there is state-heterogeneity in taxed commodities. In particular, expression (8)
implies that if state s does not own commodity i, a change in the federal tax rate Ti a¤ects tjs solely
through the CS channel. Put di¤erently, when bis = 0 the common-pool mechanism is eliminated.
Conversely, if bis > 0, changes in tjs occur through all channels.
In the Appendix, we provide three specic examples that study the impact of the federal sev-
erance tax rate on capital-income, corporate, and sales state taxes.16 They show that in all cases
the common-pool mechanism is negative. The ambiguity of its sign vanishes because part of the
variation in the marginal revenue is neutralized by the change in the level of consumption, thus
suggesting that the common-pool channel is mainly driven by the change in the marginal utility
of private-good consumption. Since this marginal utility increases with Ti, the marginal utility
derived from the services provided by the state public good needs to increase as well; this, in turn,
causes the supply of the state public good and the state tax rate to decrease.
The CS channel is, on the other hand, always positive. This occurs because in these more
specic cases the fall in the tax base of the capital-income, corporate and sales state taxes brought
about by the increase in the federal tax rate is relatively small. As a consequence of these opposing
forces, all else equal, weaker complementarity between g and G may lead state governments to
react in an opposite manner to federal tax shocks due to the common pool mechanism. Conversely,
su¢ ciently high complementarity may lead to a positive comovement in the two-level tax rates.
The most important takeaway message from our generic model and the more specic tax cases
presented in the Appendix is that having a design where the federal tax shock is on an immobile tax
base, and some states are su¢ ciently rich in it, then the sign, magnitude, and relative importance
of the CS channel can be identied by observing changes in ti in states that do not own that type
of tax base. We exploit these features in the empirical part.
In particular, in the empirical part we focus on a federal tax on extractive industries because
they employ natural resources, which possess an immobile nature and are only present in some
16Results with a labor-income tax would be qualitatively the same to the ones that we obtain with corporate taxes.
This is because in the model presented in the Appendix each rm is owned by an entrepreneur so that prots work
like the return to labor.
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locations due to their inherent geographic characteristics. Then, state di¤erences in the size of
the non-mobile tax base will enable to maintain the common-pool e¤ect within specic states. in
addition, natural resources o¤er signicant rents. As we show later when investigating U.S. states,
in some cases (e.g. Alaska, Wyoming) their income can add up to more than 40% out of all income
sources of the state. This, in turn, implies that tax shocks related to them may be meaningfully
impactful for both the state and federal governments.
Another lesson that we extract from the theoretical analysis is that taxes are not the only force
that can change tax-base levels. There exists the possibility that input movements, like capital
ows, triggered by changes in statestax rates can a¤ect the nal outcome in all states to some
extent, as illustrated in more detail in the cases presented in the Appendix. This has various
empirical implications which we will consider; for instance, the need to control for inter-state factor
movements.
3 Empirical Evidence
The analytical framework illustrated the potential key role of the CS mechanism within the larger
vertical scal dynamics. In this section we seek to provide empirical evidence for the g   G CS
channel, including its magnitude, sources, and relative importance compared to the common-pool
channel. We do so by taking the U.S. as a case study, and exploiting a quasi-natural experiment
the 1980 Crude Oil Windfall Actwhich follows the case of a change in Ti where bis = 0 for some
of the states, thus providing a design under which the g   G CS e¤ect is potentially identiable.
Next, we discuss the details of this act, and its applicability to our case.
3.1 The 1980 Crude Oil Windfall Act
Throughout the 1970s the price of domestic oil was controlled by the U.S. federal government,
which started decontrolling it in 1979, completing the process in 1981. Concurrently, the price
of oil surged, peaking in the early 1980s, as illustrated in Figure 1. Realizing this would provide
signicant prots to American oil producers, the Carter Administration enacted the Crude Oil
Windfall Act in 1980, which was an excise tax on domestic crude oil imposed at the wellhead. The
tax was paid on the di¤erence between the market price of oil and a base price which was set as the
May 1979 oil price adjusted for ination. The aim of the Carter Administration was, on the one
hand, to prevent oil producers from reaping excessive prots and, on the other, to use the raised
revenues to assist low-income households, fund mass transit, and explore new energy sources. As
a commitment device, the administration proposed to put the revenues in a trust fund to ensure
that they are used for these purposes.
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Given the decrease in the oil price during the 1980s, the consequent decline in revenues from the
said tax (decreasing to virtually none in 1987), and various political pressures that accompanied this
decline, the bill was eventually repealed in 1988.17 Therefore, revenues were collected for 7 scal
years, during 1980-1986. Figure 2 presents the annual collections, which sum up to approximately
80$ billion. This represents a relatively large magnitude compared to those produced by other
federal tax changes during the 1980s.18 Nonetheless, this yields a relatively small change in the
total federal revenues. Notably, previous empirical studies on vertical tax externalities in the U.S.
suggest that changes of this magnitude produce noticeable scal reactions by state governments.19
The analysis to follow indicates that this is also the case when focusing more specically on the CS
e¤ect.
Importantly, the federal tax is specically on a non-mobile factor (oil sector); it hence follows
the case of a change in Ti where bis = 0 for some of the states, presented in Section 2, creating
a common-pool problem solely in the oil rich states. More specically, the latter occurs because
the tax is imposed directly on the oil producers, who in turn cannot forward it to the selling price
given that it has been deregulated in the U.S. by that point and is therefore determined by global
demand. The result is a decrease in domestic oil production, and hence an erosion of the tax base
of oil endowed states specically. The magnitude is non-trivial. In a report prepared by the U.S.
Congressional Research Service, Lazzari (2006) estimates the COWA-driven reduction in domestic
oil production during the period of 1980-1986. Appendix Table A1 outlines the annual estimated
magnitudes. In 1981, for instance, COWA decreased oil production by approximately 310 million
barrels, or about 8.3% of total oil output. The estimated reduction over 1980-1986 is around 4.8%
of total oil output (approximately 1268 million barrels).
Additional features make this federal tax policy appealing for our purposes. First, using narra-
tive sources Romer and Romer (2010) classied the COWA tax change as exogenous given it was
motivated by long-run concerns. While their rational relates primarily to GDP, it is also applicable
to state tax rates; having a long-term perspective suggests that the enactment of this act was not
driven by short-term changes in state tax rates. This, in turn, contributes to considering the tax
17During this time there were several amendments made to it. Some were minor and technical, and others more
substantial (under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, for instance), decreasing tax rates on newly discovered
oil, and introducing a tax credit for royalty owners, among others. Nonetheless, the tax remained e¤ective, and
revenues were collected until it was repealed.
18Computing the present value of the change in federal revenues induced by major federal tax acts (reporting it at
the year the acts were enacted), Romer and Romer (2010) report that COWAs expected e¤ect on federal revenues
is larger (in absolute value) than that of other major federal tax changes enacted in the 1980s, such as the Decit
Reduction Act of 1984, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987.
19For instance, Reingewertz (2018) identies vertical scal externalities using Romer and Romers (2010) sample
of federal tax changes, which includes COWA as well as other federal tax shocks of smaller magnitude.
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policy change itself as being plausibly exogenous. Second, as outlined above the tax collections, as
well as the decision to eventually repeal the act, were primarily based on variations in the inter-
national price of crude oil. Assuming the latter is an exogenous variable determined in the global
market, the annual COWA shocks we examine are plausibly exogenous as well. These features take
a central role in the empirical analysis. Last, the tax change takes place in the U.S., an economy
that follows the analytical framework closely in terms of presenting a federal environment with am-
ple cross-state variation in resource abundance and non-redistributed resource income, as Figure 3
illustrates.20
3.2 Data and methodology
Our objective is to decompose the statesvertical tax reactions to the federal COWA tax shocks to
their CS and common-pool components, with an emphasis on identifying the former. To do so we
examine the heterogeneous scal reactions across stateslevel of resource richness, via a di¤erence-
in-di¤erences approach. Next, we describe the treatment e¤ect, treated group, methodology, and
identication strategy. Starting with the treatment e¤ect. While the experiment we examine
(COWA) represents a change in federal tax policies, the vertical tax reactions of state governments
are rather tied to changes in federal expenditures by state. Hence, as a rst step we test whether tax
receipts from COWA were translated, to some extent, to spending at the federal level in general.
The analysis and results are relegated to the Appendix.21 We nd that COWA revenues were
indeed associated with increased public expenditure at the federal level, following the programs
initial o¢ cial objectives on revenue usage.
Motivated by these initial observations we construct the treatment e¤ect. As noted, the focus
is on COWA tax collections yet the vertical reactions are made, ultimately, to changes in federal
expenditures. This point is central to our analysis because complementarities or substitutabilities
are essentially a product of the relations of state and federal expenditures. Hence, ideally our
treatment needs to capture the changes in the state-specic federal expenditures that were driven
by COWA, during the treatment period. These data are not observed directly. Instead, we construct
a proxy that implicitly assumes that the national COWA tax collections were allocated across states
based on the relative allocations of all other federal expenditures, captured via the observed state-
specic federal expenditures per capita in each state.22 We construct this proxy (treatment) in two
20We measure resource abundance by state income from severance taxes. While these taxes pertain to the produc-
tion of fossil fuels in general, oil takes a central role in its composition.
21Specically, it is discussed in Appendix C, with the results presented in Table A2, and descriptive statistics
provided in Table A3.
22Later we also show for robustness that similar results are produced in case we assume that the COWA tax
collections were allocated equally across the nation based on the distribution of population.
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stages. In the rst stage we take the tted values of the following state-specic regression, for each
state i separately, at year t, estimated over our treatment years (1980-1986):
F it = + (COWA)t + i;t; (9)
where F i denotes the real per capita federal expenditures in state i, and COWA denotes the annual
tax collections from COWA. More specically, F i represents the state-specic per capita federal
expenditures, net of federal transfers and direct payments to individuals. This subtraction enables
focusing the analysis on the portion of federal expenditures that may relate to complementarities
or substitutabilities. Equivalently, it ensures that our estimates do not capture mechanic comple-
mentarities related to matching grants, or federal redistribution. Notice that a higher F i yields a
higher F iFV (tted values), consistent with the allocation assumption; i.e. states in which federal
expenditures are relatively higher are assumed to be equivalently allocated proportionally higher
COWA-sourced federal expenditures.
A key feature of the state-specic federal expenditure data is that it is available from 1981,
unlike our treatment that begins in 1980. To maximize the constructed treatment e¤ect, we expand
F i to 1980 based on the assumption that it is distributed equally across the nation. Under this
assumption, the F i for 1980 is the national federal expenditures (net of transfers and payments
to individuals) divided by the national population, for all i. This assumption is strong if the
comparison is indeed across states. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which shows that F i (1981-
1986) has much variation across states. However, in our di¤erence-in-di¤erences framework, the
key comparison is between the treated and control groups (described below). Figure 5 shows that
F i (1981-1986) exhibits little di¤erence between the two state-groups, motivating the expansion we
take for 1980. Nonetheless, later in the analysis we show that the main results hold when 1980 is
excluded from the sample.
An additional key point relates to COWA. While F i is at the state level, COWA remains
to be at the national level, representing the overall annual tax collections from COWA, across all
states. Maintaining the national perspective with COWA is an important feature of the empirical
analysis because it follows the design of the analytical framework in which tax collections from
resource rich states are translated to federal expenditures in states that are not endowed with this
tax base. Translating COWA to the state level does not capture this feature because no collections
were made from the resource poor states.
Moving to the second stage of the treatment construction, we take the FFV (tted values) of
each state, and merge them into a single treatment e¤ect, which we denote by CA (representing
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an abbreviation of COWA).23 This measure, hence, gives the COWA-driven real per capita federal
expenditures in each state (net of transfers and payments to individuals), representing the treatment
examined in the analysis. Importantly, it has both cross-sectional and time variation. Its basic
descriptive statistics are outlined in Table 1. Notably, the mean CA is around 40$ (with a standard
deviation of approximately 28$). This, in turn, suggests that while the scope of COWA may be
relatively small compared to the general federal revenues, the extent to which it impacts state-
specic federal expenditures may nevertheless induce an observable CS e¤ect,24 and hence enable
the identication of its sign and other relevant characteristics.
Thus, the treatment we examine is CA, during the period of 1980-1986. The treated group
(RR, denoting resource rich), under the benchmark analysis, includes the states that had at least
some positive income from natural resources during the treatment years; this denition applies
to 32 states. The control group (NRR, denoting non resource rich) includes the remaining 18
states. The list of states included in each group is provided in the data Appendix. Despite its
inclusion of relatively resource poor states in the treated group, we adopt this division for the
baseline estimation as it ensures that the tax bases of the economies in the control group are not
a¤ected by the tax policy examined.
To that end, we employ an annual-based panel of the 50 U.S. states that covers the period of
1963-2007, with which we estimate variations of the following model, for state i at time t:
taxratesi;t = + (CA RR)i;t 1 + (CA NRR)i;t 1 + (X)i;t 1 + t + i + i;t: (10)
In terms of notation, taxrates represents either statutory or average tax rates. Our primary focus,
however, is on the former because it is independent of the tax base. In each case, we examine the
three main types of state tax rates, namely income, corporate, and sales tax rates. The statutory
versions are the top income and corporate tax rates and the given sales tax rates. The average
versions are measured as the GSP share of the tax revenues levied from each tax type (income,
corporate, or sales). For each case (statutory or average) we construct a baseline tax rate that
incorporates the three separate tax rates. In e¤ect, this baseline version is a weighted average of
the three, with the weights being the share of the tax revenues of each in their sum, in the initial
year (1963).25 These weights represent the relative size of each tax base in each state. Constructing
23This method is inspired by the methodology of Frankel and Romer (1999) and Raveh and Reshef (2016). More
formally, CAit = F
i
FV;t; however, since FVFV;t is estimated for each i separately, CA represents their aggregate, across
all i. As an example, in the rst stage FVFV;t is estimated separately for, e.g., Alabama (AL) and California (CA);
thereafter, in the second stage FV ALFV;t and FV
CA
FV;t are aggregated into CA
i
t, which similarly includes FVFV;t for all i.
24As the earlier discussion suggests, states do not observe the revenue source of the federal expenditures. In e¤ect,
statesreaction is to the federal expenditures, which they do observe and which are COWA-driven in the case of CA.
25More formally, for each state we dene sum = inc63 + corp63 + sales63, where inc63/corp63/sales63 are
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them based on data in the initial year of the sample enables highlighting the general cross-state
di¤erences while mitigating endogeneity related concerns. In addition, using the same weights in
both the statutory and average cases ensures that both tax rates pertain to the same underlying
tax base.
The variable CA denotes the treatment constructed previously. The measures RR and NRR
are binary variables that capture the states included in each of these groups as described above.
Their interaction is examined at t   1 because COWA collections are undertaken throughout the
year and the vertical reactions, via taxrates, are expected to occur thereafter. Last, t and i
are state and year xed e¤ects that control for unobserved time-invariant state heterogeneity, and
state-invariant within-year shocks. Importantly, the latter control for changes in the oil price, which
as noted are tied to the COWA revenues yet may a¤ect local income more broadly (as indicated,
for instance, by Acemoglu, Finkelstein, and Notowidigdo (2013)).
X is a vector that includes various relevant measures that are suggested by the model and
previous research; these enter the model in t   1 to capture benchmark levels at the time the
shock occurs.26 First, real GSP per capita, which controls for income di¤erences; importantly,
this also captures income e¤ects manifested via changes in the oil price. Second, real per capita
state expenditures, which controls for the demand for public goods. Third, real per capita inter-
governmental transfers from the federal government to the states, which controls for transfer-driven
state scal behavior (Smart (1998)). Last, annual changes in statesreal per capita capital stock
(derived from Garofalo and Yamarik (2002) and its extension),27 and population to control for
potential factor movements that may occur due to both COWA-driven and resource-driven changes
in state tax rates.28
Some further points regarding the empirical model. Its form is motivated by condition (8),
and the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach.29 Note that the separate components of the interaction
state tax revenues from income/corporate/sales tax in 1963, respectively. Then, weight_x = x=sum, where
x 2 (inc63; corp63; sales63), represent the weights for each tax type, for 1963. Finally, the baseline tax rate at
year t is dened as: Baseline_taxt = (inct  weight_inc63) + (corpt  weight_corp63) + (salest  weight_sales63).
Computing Baseline_tax1980 for the case of New York as an example, in 1963 the shares of income/corporate/sales
tax revenues in their sum were 0:48, 0:19, and 0:33, respectively. The statutory income/corporate/sales tax rates
were 0:14, 0:1, and 0:04, respectively. Therefore, Baseline_tax1980 = 0:14  0:48 + 0:19  0:1 + 0:33  0:04 = 0:0994.
26Nonetheless, results remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar if these measures are considered in their
contemporaneous form.
27Specically, Garofalo and Yamarik (2002) provide these data for the pre-1997 years. Post-1996 gures are based
on their extension of their original data, available on the second authors homepage.
28The model suggests, via its additional analysis in the Appendix, that changes in resource income may a¤ect
ti. This result was discussed in previous studies that examined tax competition settings with state-heterogeneity in
non-mobile endowments (Cai and Treisman (2005), Perez-Sebastian and Raveh (2016), Perez-Sebastian, Raveh, and
Reingewertz (2016), and Raveh (2013)), and substantiated empirically by James (2014).
29Condition (8) suggests examining the di¤erence in federal tax rate on the di¤erence in the state tax rate. The
variable CA mimics the former, as it captures the federal expenditures triggered by the additional federal tax revenues
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terms are excluded; this is because the average CA e¤ect is absorbed by the inclusion of both
interactions, and the state-division variables (RR and NRR) are absorbed by the state xed ef-
fects. The inclusion of both interactions, in lieu of the average e¤ect, stands at the center of the
decomposition analysis, as we further explain below. Nonetheless, as an initial analysis, we also
examine a specication in which the average e¤ect is included in lieu of the NRR interaction term.
Wherever possible, explanatory variables enter the analyses in their natural logarithm form to bet-
ter account for potential outliers.30 Examining the e¤ects of a federal, common shock, we follow
a relatively conservative two-way clustering approach and cluster the standard errors by state and
year. Unless specied otherwise, variables are derived from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
and the U.S. Census Bureau. Further sources and descriptions of all variables are outlined in the
data Appendix. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the general sample; Appendix Table A4
provides the same, for the RR and NRR groups separately.
Our main focus is on the coe¢ cients  and , with a particular emphasis on the latter. Together
they give the total di¤erence in di¤erences in the vertical tax reactions to CA. The total vertical
response, which we seek to decompose, is the sum of common-pool and CS e¤ects. The basic insight
employed is that the scal reaction coming from NRR () is driven by g   G complementarities
or substitutabilities, once factor movements are controlled for. Hence,  is indicative of the CS
channel. Importantly, its interpretation does not rely on additional assumptions, such as imposing
equal complementarity patterns across the nation.
In turn, the scal reaction coming from RR () is driven by both g  G complementarities or
substitutabilities, and common-pool e¤ects. To be able to interpret  as indicative of the common-
pool e¤ect we require that the degrees of the g  G CS e¤ect be similar across the RR and NRR
groups. In such a case the common-pool-driven component can be isolated from  by subtracting
 from it. Nonetheless, given this additional assumption we interpret the estimates of  with more
caution, and maintain a primary focus on .
The identication strategy is based on various points. First, on the plausibly exogenous charac-
teristics of COWA as described earlier, including its enactment, annual shocks, and repeal. Second,
on the geographically-based nature of the state-division. Examining the list of NRR states and
comparing it to the long averages of resource income that appear in Figure 3 we see that these
states had almost no income from resources during all sample years. Based on this observation
collected each year, due to the change in the tax rate. The latter is applicable via the di¤erence-in-di¤erences
approach. Hence, the baseline specication examines the dependent variable in levels. Nonetheless, we show in a
later sub-section that the main results are robust to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. In addition, as will
be evident, in cases where each group is examined separately we control for a lagged dependent variable, to examine
changes directly.
30This transformation does not a¤ect the results.
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we assume that this resource scarcity is geographically entrenched, and hence plausibly exogenous.
Last, on an identifying variation that relies on a common-trend between the treatment and control
groups in non-treatment years, which we discuss next.
3.3 Initial analysis
The main specication, namely equation (10), enables observing the reactions of RR and NRR.
To motivate this form, within a di¤erence-in-di¤erences framework, and present a formal test of
common trends in non-treatment years, we start with estimating the following, standard di¤erence-
in-di¤erences specication:
taxratesi;t = + (CA)i;t 1 + (CA RR)i;t 1 + (X)i;t 1 + t + i + i;t: (11)
The key di¤erence from the baseline specication is the inclusion of CA in lieu of NRR 
CA. In this case, therefore,  gives the total di¤erence in di¤erences (equivalent to   in the
baseline model). Results appear in Table 2. Column 1 (2) represents the case in which taxrates
is the baseline statutory (average) tax rate. The precisely estimated negative s indicate that the
treatment yields a di¤erence in the di¤erences, in the expected direction. This result, in turn,
motivates the decomposition of this observed di¤erence in the di¤erences in the following (main)
analysis.
Within this initial specication we can also test for common trends in non-treatment years. To
do so, we consider the following model:
taxratesi;t = + (CA)i;t 1 + z[(CA RR)i;t 1  Y earz] + (X)i;t 1 + i + i;t; (12)
where z 2 (1963; 2007), and Y earz is a dummy for year z. In e¤ect, this specication undertakes
a generalized di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation of equation (11), in which the total di¤erence
(CA  RR) in interacted with the sample years (1963-2007), t is excluded, and taxrates is the
baseline statuary tax rate.31 The reference year is 1963. The results (zs and their 95% condence
interval bands) are plotted in Figure 6. As observed, z is negative and precisely estimated only in
COWA years. Conversely, in pre-1980 and post-1986 years (i.e. non-COWA periods) its magnitude
(in absolute value) and statistical preciseness signicantly drop.32 These patterns illustrate the
common-trend in non-COWA years.
The latter point deserves further comment. A key factor in our identication strategy is the
31The variable CA in this case is assigned a value of 1 in non-treatment years to identify the separate year e¤ects.
32Notably, a plot of a generalized di¤erence-in-di¤erences version of the main specication, presented in the following
sub-section, points at a similar observation.
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oil price. On one hand, it provides plausibly exogenous variation for the treatment. On the other,
however, it may be argued that it contributes to the di¤erential e¤ect observed in treatment years.
Figures 1 and 6 deliver a central observation that addresses this issue. We see in Figure 1 that
the oil price changes continuously throughout our sample period; nevertheless, it does not yield
an observable di¤erence in the di¤erences during non-treatment years in Figure 6, even in periods
of extreme changes such as during the 1970s. This, in turn, suggests that the magnitude of its
di¤erent e¤ect on the RR and NRR groups is common throughout the sample. Hence, we can
assume that it remains similar as well during treatment years. We consider further aspects of this
issue in the empirical analysis, including controlling for time xed e¤ects and undertaking placebo
tests that examine pre-COWA years.
3.4 Benchmark results
Next, we present the results of the main analysis, which are outlined in Table 3. Column 1 estimates
equation (10), in which taxrates is the baseline statutory tax rate. This represents our benchmark
specication. The estimated  and  provide the key empirical insights. Starting with the former,
the precisely estimated positive , representing the portion of the response coming from NRR,
points at a positive CS e¤ect. The positive sign suggests that g and G are on average complements;
an increase in federal expenditures, via the additional COWA federal tax collections, increases the
tax rates in NRR states. Recall that this represents a net e¤ect, under a sub-sample of federal
expenditures.33 Nonetheless, to interpret the magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in CA
(28$) increases the baseline statutory tax rate by about 0:19 percentage points, or approximately
one tenth of its standard deviation.34
Moving to the latter, under the additional assumption that the degree of complementarity
is similar across state-groups, the signicant negative  suggests that the common-pool e¤ect is
negative. An increase in the COWA-driven federal expenditures decreases the baseline statutory
tax rates in RR states due to a contraction in the oil-related tax base. By comparing  to 
it can be deduced that the CS-driven vertical reaction comprises approximately 38% of the total
reaction;35 the common-pool-driven portion accounts for the balance. To observe these patterns
33Some federal expenditures items substitute state-level ones, while others complement it. We observe the aggregate,
net e¤ect. In addition, as noted expenditure items that induce mechanic complementarity (i.e. matching grants) are
excluded.
34A one standard deviation in CA, 0.028 (thousand $), multiplied by the estimate on  (0.067) is 0.0019, which is
0.19 percentage points, or about one tenth of the standard deviation of the baseline statutory tax rate, namely 0.02.
35This is calculated in three steps. First, we subtract  from ; this yields the magnitude of the common-pool
e¤ect ( 0:041 0:067). Second, we take the common-pool measure in absolute value, and add  to it (0:108+0:067);
this gives the magnitude of the total vertical response. Last, we a divide  by the latter (0:067=0:175); this provides
the portion of the CS channel in the overall vertical scal reaction.
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graphically, Figure 7 plots the estimates obtained from estimating a version of equation (10), in
which the treatment (CA) is interacted with the sample years (1963-2007), for RR and NRR, and
the year xed e¤ects are excluded. The negative (positive) impact in RR (NRR) during treatment
years is clearly observed.36
In the next two columns we examine the two groups, RR and NRR, separately to observe the
distinct e¤ects more directly, outside the scope of the di¤erence. Column 2 examines the restricted
sample of the NRR states; Column 3 focuses on the remaining, RR states. Because this division
does not focus on the di¤erence in di¤erences it yields a level regression that is inconsistent with
condition (8). To correct for that we estimate a dynamic version of equation (10), by adding a lagged
dependent variable. In addition, the interaction terms are excluded (CA  RR and CA  NRR)
in lieu of the average e¤ect (CA) on which we focus. Last, to address the potential Nickell bias
(Nickell (1981)) we follow the Arellano-Bond estimation procedure (Arellano and Bond (1991)) in
which a rst-di¤erence of equation (10) is examined (hence, state xed e¤ects are dropped) and
explanatory variables are instrumented using their lagged values.
The coe¢ cient on CA provides the expected result in both cases, supporting the patterns ob-
served in Figure 6 during the years 1980-1986. In Column 2 (NRR case) it is positive, yet in
Column 3 (RR case) it is negative. This distinction provides further clarication of the decompo-
sition undertaken in the earlier cases. It is not the case that the observed positive e¤ect in the
NRR group is relative to the RR one which experienced a steep fall; rather, NRR states increased
their tax rates as a response to COWA regardless of RRs behavior, pointing more directly at
complementarity-driven vertical tax reactions.
Departing from the case of statutory tax rates, Columns 4-6 follow the specications of Columns
1-3 with the dependent variable (taxrates) being the baseline average tax rates. The results are
similar in sign, magnitude, and precision to those obtained under the statutory cases. Specically,
the CS (common-pool) is positive (negative), and accounts for approximately 40% of the total
vertical response.
3.5 Tax disaggregation
A key question that emerges from the benchmark analysis relates to the underlying sources. How
are the CS and common-pool e¤ects manifested? To address that we next follow a disaggregated
approach to the main analysis, examining di¤erent types of state tax rates; specically, those that
comprise the baseline versions. Results appear in Table 4. We follow the benchmark specications,
as per Columns 1 and 4 of Table 3, where taxrates denote categories of either statutory or average
36Notably, the patterns in the non-COWA periods further highlight the common-trend in non-treatment years.
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tax rates. In the former case, we test the cases of the top corporate and income tax rates, as well
as the overall sales tax rates (Columns 1-3); in the latter case, we examine the cases of the average
corporate, income, and sales tax rates (Columns 4-6).
Two key observations emerge from the estimations. First, the CS channel appears to be mani-
fested primarily via sales and income taxation. This is suggested by the results of  in each of the
columns. Interpreting the sign and signicance, rather than magnitudes, only the cases of income
and sales tax rates exhibit a precisely estimated, positive outcome. This suggests that as a response
to a federal tax shock, the average NRR state nds it most e¤ective to increase its tax revenues
through the labor side. Second, the negative common-pool e¤ect appears to be triggered by a de-
crease in both (RR) capital and labor taxation. This is suggested by the estimates of , which are
constantly lower than  in all cases. This is consistent with the notion that under the common-pool
there is a general contraction of the tax base. Unlike the case of the CS e¤ect, in which state gov-
ernments choose the source of nance, in the case of the common-pool the contraction is apparent
across the board.
3.6 g-G complementarities
The main analysis focuses on vertical tax reactions, and the role of the CS channel within them. The
latter, however, operates through the production side via complementarities or substitutabilities
between the federal and state expenditures. In this sub-section we examine this link more directly,
in an attempt to shed further light on the nature of the underlying mechanism of the CS-driven
vertical tax response.
The treatment e¤ect indicates how COWA collections are translated to federal expenditures.
Next, we test its e¤ect on the overall state expenditures, as well as on the more specic, main
expenditure categories, namely transportation, education, health, welfare, and safety. We do so by
estimating a variation of equation (10) in which taxrates is replaced by the real per capita state
expenditures in each of the categories.37 We undertake a separate estimation for each case. Results
appear in Table 5. Column 1 presents the case of overall state expenditures, whereas Columns 2-6
examine the more specic expenditure categories.
As noted, the CS relationship is more clearly observed in the NRR states, hence similar to
the previous cases our focus is on . The positive and precise s in Columns 1-3 indicate that g
and G are, on average, complements, and that this is primarily due to g  G complementarities in
37These variables enter the regressions in their natural logarithm form. This transformation enables mitigating
the impact of outliers, and is enabled in this case given that there are no zero expenditures in any of the categories.
Nonetheless, similar patterns are observed in case the outcome variables enter the estimated model in levels.
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transportation and welfare expenditures.38 This lends support to the initial motivating example,
and indicates that federal expenditures related to these categories complement state public goods
and thus induce increases in state expenditures. To interpret the magnitude, a one standard
deviation increase in the treatment (28$) induces an increase of approximately 1$ in transportation-
related state expenditures, and an additional 1$ in welfare-related state expenditures.39 In the
remaining categories estimates point at an ambiguous CS relationship, where some complementarity
may exist but nonetheless counteracted by some concurrent substitutability; interestingly, no clear
substitutability e¤ect is apparent in any of the categories.
3.7 Robustness tests
To this point we presented the benchmark results on  and . In this sub-section we undertake
some robustness checks to examine whether the baseline patterns are robust to various modica-
tions. Specically, we test additional specications, sample restrictions, and resource abundance
thresholds, as well as undertake placebo tests to further motivate the role of COWA in our results.
3.7.1 Specications, state divisions, and sample restrictions
The baseline specication, as per Column 1 of Table 3, followed the specication of equation (10)
due to the di¤erence in di¤erences framework that, as noted, maintains consistency with condition
(8). We start by testing the robustness of the main results to adopting a framework that examines
the di¤erence in di¤erences in the changes in the dependent variable. We do so by adding a lagged
dependent variable to the specication.40 To address the potential Nickell bias (Nickell (1981)),
we follow the previously outlined Arellano-Bond estimation procedure (Arellano and Bond (1991)).
Results appear in Column 1 of Table 6. The estimated  and  indicate that the main results are
robust to this specication.
Second, the baseline analysis examines the sample period of 1963-2007. One concern is that
the relatively long pre-period may a¤ect the extent to which the null hypothesis is rejected. We
address this in two ways. First, we consider a shorter time period; specically, we limit the pre-
event and post-event periods to 10 years, hence restricting the sample to the overall period of
1970-1996. Second, following Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004), we collapse the sample
38This gains further support via the previously noted evidence (provided in the Appendix) on the translation of
COWA collections to federal expenditures in these categories.
39Notably, this presents a lower-bound estimate. As noted, the treatment e¤ect excludes federal expenditure
categories that are expected to induce mechanic complementarities with state expenditures (i.e. matching grants).
An increase in CA may therefore induce further CS-driven increases in g via this mechanic, excluded channel.
40This specication is equivalent to one in which the dependent variable is the rate of change between period t  1
and t.
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into three periods that represent the averages of the pre-treatment, treatment, and post-treatment
time intervals. Results appear in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6, respectively. Both cases indicate
that the sign, precision, and relative magnitude of  are robust to these modications.
Third, the benchmark results are dependent on the division of states into the two groups. The
division is motivated by the model, but is specic to the case of having no resource income in COWA-
years. To test whether the results are division-specic, we consider two di¤erent divisions. In the
rst, the NRR group includes all states that had no resource income over the whole sample period,
1963-2007, with the RR group accounting for the balance. In the second, the RR group includes
the 8 states with the highest average share of severance tax income in total tax income during our
sample period, as presented in Figure 3, with the NRR group accounting for the balance. The list
of states under each division is presented in the Appendix. The results appear in Columns 4 and 5
of Table 6. In both cases the estimated  and  exhibit the same characteristics as those estimated
in the benchmark case, indicating that the main results are robust to these changes. Interestingly,
the magnitude of the common-pool e¤ect increases in the second case, due to the composition of
the RR group (which unlike the baseline division, includes states with large resource endowments
only); in this case, the CS e¤ect accounts for approximately 29% of the vertical response.
Fourth, we test the case where 1980 is excluded from the sample. As noted, the F i measure
is provided by the U.S. Census starting in 1981; its expansion to 1980 was done manually, and
required additional assumptions. To test the robustness of the main results to this expansion, in
Column 6 of Table 6 we follow the baseline case (Column 1 of Table 3), with 1980 excluded from
the sample. The estimated  and  are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those estimated
under the complete sample period.
Last, we examine the case where the COWA tax collections are assumed to be equally distributed
across the nation. As noted, the constructed treatment, CA, implicitly assumes that the COWA
revenues were allocated to states based on the relative allocations of other federal expenditures.
Testing the robustness of the results to this approach, we next assume that these revenues were
allocated equally on per capita terms. Hence, CAi;t in this case is COWAt  Popi;tPopn;t , where the
numerator is state (i) population, and the denominator is the national (n) population, both in year
t. The results in Column 7 of Table 6 indicate that this alternative allocative rule yields similar
patterns.
3.7.2 Placebo tests
One concern that may arise from the empirical analysis lies in its relation to the oil price. Recall
that the variation in COWA tax collections are primarily based on variation in the price of oil.
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This suggests that the tax reactions observed may have represented responses to oil price changes
rather than to COWA shocks. This was addressed in the analysis in various ways, one of which was
via the time xed e¤ects that captured the downward trend in the oil price during COWA-years.
Nonetheless, the concern remains applicable to some extent in case, for instance, some oil-related
e¤ects from non-COWA-years are persistent.
To address this using a di¤erent approach we undertake some placebo tests. As Figure 1
illustrates, the oil price was decreasing strongly starting in 1981, and throughout the COWA-years.
In the preceding decade, however, the trend was largely opposite; starting in 1972, the oil price
rose steeply and continuously until peaking in 1980. Hence, the period of 1972-1979 represents a
counterfactual where the trend in the oil price was largely equivalent to the one in COWA-years in
absolute value, yet there were no COWA collections.
We therefore focus next on this period. Given that during these years the oil price e¤ect
is applicable whereas COWA is not, the hypothesis is that if no tax reactions are observed in
this placebo period then the ones estimated in the main analysis are not a result of changes in
the oil price, strengthening the focus on COWA. To test this hypothesis, we follow the same
methodology used in the main analysis, with some modications in the treatment e¤ect. Specically,
the international price of crude oil enters in lieu of COWA in equation (9), the F it for the treatment
period is constructed similar to the way it was constructed for 1980, with the treatment period
being 1972-1979. This provides a measure of the oil-price-driven federal expenditures by state,
during the placebo period. We denote this placebo treatment as pre  CA.
Results appear in Table 7. Each column mimics the baseline Column 1 of Table 1, under three
modications. First, the treatment is pre CA. Second, the period examined is 1972-1979. Third,
the state division applies to the 1972-1979 period (rather than 1980-1986); this means that the
NRR group now includes all states that had no resource income during these years, with the RR
group representing the remaining states. This case is presented in Column 1. The same is done in
Column 2 only under the stricter state division, where the NRR group includes all states that had
no resource income during all sample years (similar to Column 4 of Table 6). Last, Column 3 does
the same as well yet under the state division in which the RR group includes the 8 most resource
rich states (similar to Column 5 of Table 6). The estimated  and  in all cases are non-signicant,
having a near-zero magnitude. The patterns observed during COWA-years do not apply to the
preceding years, despite the steep change in the oil price, hence emphasizing the role of COWA in
driving the main patterns observed.
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4 Conclusion
Why do state tax rates react to federal tax shocks? This question is central to understanding vertical
scal reactions an issue that stands at the heart of scal federalism. Previous theoretical studies
focused primarily on the standard common-pool problem, while remaining agnostic about having
potential state-federal CS relationships. However, when a federal tax shock occurs, states may
change their tax rates due to both erosion of their tax base, and complementarity or substitutability
between their public goods and those of the federal government. In this paper we focused on the
latter (CS) channel, making a rst attempt to estimate its sign, magnitude, and relative importance
in vertical scal interactions.
First, we examined the channels potential importance analytically, through a generic federalism
model of vertical scal reactions. The model showed that, all else equal, the sign and magnitude
of the g   G CS channel may determine the sign of the vertical tax reaction: as a response to an
increase in the federal tax rate, states will increase their own tax rates if the public goods supplied
by the two government levels are su¢ ciently complementary. In case this condition is not met,
states will adjust their tax rates in an opposite direction to the change in the federal one, provided
that the common-pool e¤ect is negative.
In addition, the analytical framework showed that a design where the federal tax is over an
immobile tax base allows to distinguish between the CS and common-pool channels. This is enabled
because a federal tax increase leads to a vertical tax reaction composed of both the common-pool
and CS channels in states rich in the immobile factor, yet at the same time also leads to a reaction
driven only by the CS channel in states that lack the immobile input, since the immobile tax base
connes its erosion to the states where it is located.
Motivated by the analytical setting, we exploited a quasi-natural experiment that follows that
design: the 1980 Crude Oil Windfall Act. This act imposed an excise tax over the sale of crude
oil that a¤ected the income of American oil companies. Given the immobility of oil production,
this act a¤ected the tax base of oil rich states only, from which the federal government collected
approximately 80$ billion over a period of 7 years. Employing a U.S. state-level panel covering the
period of 1963-2007, we examined the statesheterogeneous tax reactions to these federal tax shocks.
We did so by following a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach, which exploited a treatment e¤ect that
captured the COWA-driven federal expenditures in each state. The scal reactions of the resource
poor states to this treatment were attributed to the CS channel. The identication strategy was
based on the plausibly exogenous nature of the treatment (COWA-based) and treatment group
(subset of states with geographically-based natural endowments), as well as on a common-trend in
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non-treatment years.
Results from the empirical analysis indicated that the CS channel takes a considerable share in
the overall vertical interactions approximately 38% in our baseline estimates. In addition, they
showed that the resource-poor statestax reactions comove with the federal tax shocks, pointing at
complementarities between state and federal public goods that is manifested primarily via changes
in statessales and income taxation. The latter, thus, suggested that a stronger reliance on labor
taxation may lead to larger dominance of the CS e¤ect in the overall vertical scal reaction. In
addition, a more direct examination of the expenditure-based CS relationship indicated that g
and G are on average complements, driven primarily by complementarities in expenditures related
to transportation and welfare. Last, the results also indicated that the common-pool channel is
negative: a greater erosion of the tax base leads to greater decreases in state tax rates.
The paper has, thus, shed new light on the sources of vertical scal reactions by providing
evidence on the magnitude, sources, and relative importance of the CS channel within the scope
of scal federalism, through a specic quasi-natural experiment that enabled its identication.
This specicity, however, came at a cost as the results are conned to oil-related scal shocks
and top-to-bottom externalities. Future research may look into scenarios that allow for cross-tax
complementarities and bottom-to-top dynamics, as well as for the examination of di¤erent time
periods and federations, as data become available.
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Online Appendix
A Additional Theoretical Results
In this appendix, we give specic functional forms to the generic theoretical framework presented
in the main text of the paper and apply it to three specic tax scenarios. In particular, consistent
with the empirical section, we assume that states di¤er in their abundance of natural resources,
and analyze the implications for the response of the state capital-income, corporate and sales tax
rates to a change in the federal severance tax rate.
We suppose that the federal government charges rms that operate in the extractive industry
(sector x) a tax rate Tn on the level of production of natural resources; that is,
T = Tn and B =
XZ
v=1
yxv; (13)
where yxv  0 represents the natural-resource industrys production level in state v. We also
consider the following specic functional forms:
v(cs) = ln cs (14)
and
 (gs; G) = (g

s +G
)1=: (15)
The value of the elasticity parameter  lies within the interval ( 1; 1]. When  equals  1 and
1, state and federal public goods are perfect complements and perfect substitutes, respectively.
Since two of the taxes studied a¤ect factors of production, we need to introduce into the frame-
work a production side that employs capital and natural resources as inputs. Here, the proposed
structure is reminiscent of the one constructed in Perez-Sebastian, Raveh, and Reingewertz (2016)
yet focuses on a di¤erent federal tax and includes the response of the rms demand for capital to
taxation. Individuals and the natural-resource input are immobile. However, we allow the capital
input to freely move across states. Following the tradition of Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) and
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), this mobility of capital adds to the setting elements of horizontal
tax competition when we consider capital taxation.41 Each individual owns a xed amount of
capital k that can be supplied to the production activity in any of the states. In return, consumers
obtain an interest rate rs per unit of capital.
We further assume that prot-maximizing rms operate under perfect competition in one of
two industries: consumption-goods production (sector m), and extraction of raw materials from the
earth (i.e., sector x). Sector m is the numeraire. For simplicity, consumption goods can be traded
among di¤erent states, whereas the output of the extractive enterprises is fully exported abroad.
Each rm that manufactures the consumption good in state s is owned by a consumer that resides
in that state. Firms that operate in the extracted industry are, on the other hand, owned by all
state residents who have equal shares of the natural input.
In state s, consumption-goods manufacturers generate output (yms) using capital (kms) accord-
ing to:
yms = k

ms; (16)
41Several studies have shown that this feature arises in a vast array of economies such as the U.S., Russia, China,
and others. See Wilson and Wildasin (2004) for a survey. Notably, we assume that the scal competition is manifested
via tax rates; however, it may be undertaken via other instruments as well, including expenditure, especially as the
latter is a¤ected by federal taxation. Nonetheless, following Wildasin (1988), we assume that the number of states is
su¢ ciently large so that Nash equilibria in tax rates and expenditures coincide.
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where  2 (0; 1), that is, the production function displays diminishing marginal returns over the
capital input. Firms in the extractive business produce output combining capital and natural
resources according to
yxs = k

xsn
1 
s ; (17)
where ns is the stock of natural resources available in state s.
Consider now that state s can impose capital-income, corporate and sales tax rates; denoted by
tks, ts and tcs, respectively. Because capital freely moves across states and under the small-economy
assumption, state governments take as given the net-of-taxes return to capital (). Therefore, it
must be the case that
 = rs(1  tks) for all s = 1; :::; Z: (18)
Incorporating this into the rst order conditions of the rms prot-maximization problem
obtains the following demand functions for capital in sectors m and x, respectively:
kms =



(1  tks)
 1
1 
(19)
and
kxs =



(p  Tn)(1  tks)
 1
1 
ns; (20)
where p is the unit price of the x-sectors output. The last two functions also depict a horizontal
competition among states, and imply that a state that charges a lower tax rate tks will attract
capital, and will end up with a larger per capita stock in its production process.
Another implication of the prot-maximizing behavior is that the prots that a rm in sector
m makes (ms) equal a fraction 1    of their output. Given the ownership structure in sector
x, we treat the rents from the exploitation of natural resources as prots, and then, prots in the
extractive industry (xs) also equal a fraction 1    of the value of output. Combining this with
expressions (16), (17), (19) and (20) obtains
ms = (1  )



(1  tks)
 
1 
(21)
and
xs = (1  )



(1  tks)
 
1 
ns(p  Tn)
1
1  : (22)
As explained in the main text, our benevolent policy-maker in state s chooses the tax rates to
solve problem (3) subject to (1), (2) and (4) internalizing the domestic-rmsbehavior. With the
specic functional forms and tax schedules considered, this problem can be written as:
max
ftks;ts;tcsg
n
u(cs; gs; G) = ln cs + (g

s +G
)1=
o
(23)
subject to
gs = tksrsks + tss + tcscs; (24)
G = Tnn; with n =
1
Z
ZX
v=1
nv; (25)
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cs =
1
1 + tcs
[(1  ts)s + k] ; (26)
and (19) to (22);
where ks = kms + kxs and s = ms + xs.
Finally, in order to close the model, we need the following market clearing conditions for capital
and goods produced by rms, respectively:
k =
1
Z
ZX
v=1
kv; (27)
ZX
v=1
(ymv + pyxv) =
ZX
v=1
(cs + gs +G): (28)
These two conditions allow for trade in capital and the two private goods across states. Remember
that we assume that the extractive industry exports abroad all output and that the number of
agents in the economy is a mass of size one.
Next, we analyze in separate subsections the impact of the federal severance tax rate Tn on
each of the three di¤erent state tax rates considered above.
A.1 Capital-income taxes
Suppose that the government in state s raises revenues only from capital taxes at rate tks. This
means that ts = tcs = 0, t = tks and b = rsks. We now ask the question: how do changes in Tn
a¤ect the optimal tks? The FOC to problem (23) with respect to tks yields:
=(1  )
1 + kc k

(1  tks)
=

1 +

Tnn
tksrsks
 1 





 
1  h
1 + ns(p  Tn)
1
1 
i
(1  tks)

1 

1  tks
1  

: (29)
The LHS of (29) represents the marginal utility of private-good consumption (MUc), and the
right hand side (RHS) gives the marginal utility of state public-good consumption (MUg), both
with respect to the tax rate tks. Looking at the RHS in more detail, it equals the CS term (above)
times the marginal revenue (below).
Combining equations (26) and (29) the FOC simplies to
1 +

Tnn
tksrsks
 1  
1  tks
1  
(
(1  )



(1  tks)
 
1  h
1 + ns(p  Tn)
1
1 
i
+ k
)
= 1:
(30)
The main di¤erence between the last two expressions is that, in the latter, some of the terms that
compose the marginal utility and the marginal revenue cancel out, eliminating the ambiguity of
the common-pool e¤ect. To see this, suppose that  = 1 in (30), so that the CS term becomes
one. The remaining terms are all associated to the common-pool mechanism, and an increase in
Tn triggers a reduction in tks. That is, the common-pool e¤ect is negative.
The sign of the CS channel can be deduced when we consider the opposite case,  =  1.
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Now, the two public goods are perfect complements and the optimal decision equalizes Tnn to
tksrsks (or G = gs). Even though we can deduce from (19) and (20) that the tax base falls if the
capital-income tax rate rises, the supply of the state public good gs increases with tks, and then,
the derivative of tks with respect to Tn is positive. Put di¤erently, as both public goods become
more complementary, gs follows the change in G more closely and always in the same direction.
Hence, the sign of dtks=dTn depends on which e¤ect dominates: if the CS e¤ect is su¢ ciently
strong i.e.,  small enough this derivative will be positive; otherwise, it will be negative.42
Mathematically, we can apply the implicit function theorem to FOC (30) to obtain:
dtks
dTn
=
(1 )

G
gs
 1h
1+

G
gs
i n  Ggs tks @rsks@Tngs (s + k) 
h

 (1  tks)(p  Tn)
i 
1 
ns
1  tks1 
 1 h
1 +

G
gs
i 1 h @FOC(tks)@tks i
: (31)
where
@rsks
@Tn
=   
1  

(1  tks)

(p  Tn)
 
1 
ns < 0: (32)
The last derivative is the result of using (19), (20) and the optimality condition that says that rs
must equal the value of the marginal product of capital.
The empirically supported value of the share of capital  is around 0:34. Hence, it is sensible to
think that tks < 1 . Which implies that the denominator of (31) is positive, because the second
derivative of the objective function with respect to the choice variable has to be always negative
(i.e., @FOC(tks)=@tks < 0). Hence, the sign of dtks=dTn is determined by the numerator.
The rst and second summands in the numerator of (31) correspond to the CS and common-pool
channels, respectively. When  = 1, the rst summand becomes zero and only the common-pool-
e¤ect term remains, which has a negative impact since p > Tn. For  smaller than zero, the CS
channel is positive. Furthermore, if state s does not have natural resources then ns equals zero
and the CS e¤ect fully drives the e¤ect of Tn on tks.
A.2 Corporate taxes
Next, we study the impact of a change in the federal severance tax rate Tn on the state corporate
tax rate ts, assuming that this is the only source of revenue for state s. That is, tks = tcs = 0,
t = ts and b = s. The FOC of problem (23) now delivers:
1 +

Tnn
tss
 1 
[(1  ts)s + k] = 1: (33)
42A similar result is obtained if we look at the impact of the natural-resource endowment on the state tax rate. The
LHS of equation (30) can be divided into three terms. The rst one, in squared brackets, captures the CS channel.
The second one, in parenthesis, collects what is left of the marginal revenue. The third one, in curly brackets, proxies
the marginal utility of consumption. If we only look at the marginal revenue and marginal utility terms, an increase
in ns requires an increase in tks to maintain the capital tax base at the same value. If on the other hand, we focus on
the CS term, the increase in the natural-resource stock induces a higher capital demand, and then, the capital-income
tax rate needs to fall to maintain the state public good at the desired level. Therefore, the sigh of dtks=dns depends
on which e¤ect dominates. Clearly, as both public goods become more complementary (lower ), a negative sign
becomes more likely. This result is also obtained with the other two tax rates considered in the Appendix.
30
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2817039 
Employing (21), (22), and the implicit function theorem, the impact of a change in the federal
severance tax rate on ts is given by
dts
dTn
=
(1 )

G
gs
 1h
1+

G
gs
i n  Ggs ts @s@Tngs [(1  ts)s + k]  (1  ts)
h

 (p  Tn)
i 
1 
nsh
1 +

G
gs
i 1 h @FOC(ts)@ts i
; (34)
where
@s
@Tn
=  



(p  Tn)
 
1 
ns < 0: (35)
Because @FOC(ts)=@ts < 0, the denominator is positive. The CS and common-pool e¤ects
captured by the rst and second summands in the numerator are again positive and negative,
respectively. Hence, as in the case of capital-income taxation, the sign of the derivative of ts with
respect to Tn is positive if the CS channel dominates, and negative if the common-pool mechanism
is the predominant one. It also becomes obvious that, if ns equals zero, this derivative is fully
driven by CS forces.
A.3 Sales taxes
Finally, we analyze the e¤ect of a variation in Tn on tcs, supposing that this is the only source of
revenue in state s (i.e., tks = ts = 0, t = tcs and b = cs). The FOC is now:
1 +

Tnn
tcscs
 1  1
1  tcs (s + k) = 1: (36)
And then
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where
@cs
@Tn
=   1
1  tcs



(p  Tn)
 
1 
ns < 0:
Regarding the sign of the common-pool and CS e¤ects, it is straightforward to show that, once
more, the common-pool e¤ect is negative and the CS e¤ect is positive. Again, if ns = 0, the change
in the state tax rate exclusively depends on the CS mechanism.
B Data
We use an annual-based state-level panel that covers the 50 U.S. states over the period of 1963-
2007. Unless otherwise specied, variables are based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis and the U.S. Census Bureau. Descriptive statistics for all variables appear in Table 1 for
the general sample, and in the Appendix Table A4 for the separate RR and NRR groups (under
the baseline division).
Variable denitions
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Real annual COWA collections: The annual receipts from the 1980 Crude Oil Windfall Act
(million $) normalized by U.S. GDP, both in 2013 prices (Source: U.S. O¢ ce of Management
and Budget). Positive collections were made only in the years 1980-1986. Annual collections are
graphed in Figure 2.
Real per capita federal expenditures by state: Real per capita federal government expenditures
in each state, net of federal transfers to states and direct payments to individuals in each state, in
1981-1986. This was expanded to 1980 using the equivalent (expenditure and population) measures
at the U.S. level, based on the assumption that in per capita terms these federal expenditures are
distributed equally across the nation.
Real per capita GSP : Real per capita Gross State Product.
Annual rate of change in real per capita capital stock : The annual rate of change in real per
capita capital stock (Source: Garofalo and Yamarik (2002) for the pre-1997 years; post-1996 gures
are based on their extension of their original data, available on the second authors homepage).
Annual rate of change in population: The annual rate of change in state population.
Statutory tax rates (baseline, corporate, income, sales): Top state corporate and income tax
rates, and state sales tax rates. The baseline version is the weighted average of these corporate,
income, and sales statutory tax rates, with the weights being the share of the tax revenues of
each in their sum, in the initial year (1963) (Source: the World Tax Database at the University of
Michigan, and the U.S. Tax Foundation).
Average tax rates (baseline, corporate, income, sales): State tax revenues (in the relevant cat-
egory) normalized by GSP. The baseline version is the weighted average of the corporate, income,
and sales average tax rates, with the weights being the share of the tax revenues of each in states
total revenues in the initial year (1963).
Real per capita general government expenditure (or in the following sub-categories: education,
health, transportation, public safety, public welfare  used in Table A2): Real per capita state
general government expenditure (or in the corresponding sub-category).
Real per capita transfers: Real per capita transfers from the federal to statesgovernments.
State divisions
Benchmark division: Resource poor statesgroup (NRR) includes all states with no severance
tax collections during COWA-years (1980-1986). These include: Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia. The remaining states
are included under the resource rich statesgroup (RR). Unless otherwise specied, this division is
used, including in the relevant gures.
NRR-no-resources, all sample, division: Resource poor statesgroup (NRR) includes all states
with no severance tax collections during all sample years (1963-2007). These include: Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont. The remaining states are included under the
resource rich statesgroup (RR). This division is used in Regression 4 of Table 6, and Regression
2 of Table 7.
RR-dominance division: Resource rich statesgroup (RR) includes the 8 states with the highest
average share of severance tax income in total tax income during our sample period, as presented
in Figure 3. These include: Alaska, Louisiana, Montana, North Dakota, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Texas, and Wyoming. The remaining states are included under the resource poor statesgroup
(NRR). This division is used in Regression 5 of Table 6, and Regression 3 of Table 7.
NRR-no-resources, pre-COWA-years, division: Resource poor states group (NRR) includes
all states with no severance tax collections during pre-COWA-years (1972-1979). These include:
Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and West
Virginia. The remaining states are included under the resource rich states group (RR). This
division is used in Regression 1 of Table 7.
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C COWA and Federal Spending
In this section we undertake a brief, descriptive, exploration of the federal expenditure categories
a¤ected by COWA, to realize whether tax receipts from COWA were translated , at least to some
extent, to spending at the federal level. As mentioned previously, the general objective of the federal
administration was to use the revenues collected from COWA to assist low-income households,
invest in mass transit, and explore new energy sources. Let us test whether this was indeed the
case; specically, whether COWA receipts are associated with federal spending in these categories.
To do so, we estimate the following simple time-series model for year t:
spendingt = +(net_receipts)t+(COWA)t+ (gdppc)t+ (net_spending)t+year+ t; (38)
where spending denotes one of the nine main federal spending functions: energy, regional devel-
opment, transportation, income and social security, housing, education, health, national defense,
and others.43 COWA represents the plausibly exogenous annual federal tax collections derived
from COWA, net_receipts denotes the federal revenues net of COWA, gdppc is per capita U.S.
GDP, net_spending is the federal spending net of spending (i.e. net of federal spending in the
category examined), and year is a time trend.44 The period covered is 1963-2007, consistent with
the one covered in the main analysis. All measures are in real terms. Data is from the U.S. O¢ ce
of Management and Budget. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table A3.
Our interest lies in the parameter , which measures whether the COWA tax revenues from
1980 to 1986 a¤ected the spending category, controlling for other federal receipts and expenditures,
general income level, and a time trend. Results appear in Table A2. The sign and signicance of
 in the various cases indicate that COWA tax revenues are positively related to federal spending
on energy, regional development, transportation, and income and social security, but do not bear a
notable relation with the remaining spending categories. The apparent match between the a¤ected
categories and those targeted upon enactment of the act suggests that the objectives of the federal
administration were met to some extent; importantly, they indicate that the COWA tax receipts
were indeed translated, to some degree, to federal public spending.
43Othersis an aggregate of the remaining relatively smaller functions that include: International a¤airs, Science,
Agriculture, Justice, General Government, and Allowances.
44Given the time-series framework, one concern is that our measures are non-stationary. Note, however, that the
residuals from all the following estimations appear stationary, via Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, hence not rejecting
the possibility of cointegration.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics -- main, state-level, panel 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Real per capita GSP 31281.08 10951.71 11351.48 110865.7 
Real COWA collections, 1980-1986 (Million $) 11176.14 6825.18 2251 23252 
Real state-specific federal expenditures per capita (net of transfers and payments to 
individuals), 1980-1986 (Thousand $) 
0.684 0.436 0.082 2.151 
Treatment effect (CA) -- COWA-driven real state-specific federal expenditures per 
capita (net of transfers and payments to individuals), 1980-1986 (Thousand $) 
0.039 0.028 0.005 0.146 
Real per capita federal transfers to state governments 573.27 515.50 27.21 3916.77 
Real per capita state government expenditure 3496.01 1912.14 852.14 17485.54 
Annual rate of change in real per capita capital stock 0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.42 
Annual rate of change in population 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.10 
Baseline statutory tax rates 0.05 0.02 0 0.14 
Baseline average tax rates 0.02 0.007 0.005 0.05 
Average corporate tax rates 0.003 0.003 0 0.04 
Average income tax rates 0.01 0.009 0 0.04 
Average sales tax rates 0.03 0.01 0.003 0.05 
Top corporate tax rate 0.06 0.03 0 0.12 
Top income tax rate 0.05 0.04 0 0.2 
Sales tax rate (statutory) 0.04 0.02 0 0.08 
Real per capita state government expenditure on education 1128.97 524.92 138.54 3871.36 
Real per capita state government expenditure on health 99.98 83.67 3.97 645.35 
Real per capita state government expenditure on transportation 369.13 198.79 110.40 2192.85 
Real per capita state government expenditure on public welfare 608.86 435.84 43.23 2549.25 
Real per capita state government expenditure on public safety 74.01 73.11 2 463.52 
Notes: Figures are in 2009 prices. See Appendix for detailed description of variables. 
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Table 2: Total difference in differences, State tax rates and COWA, 1963-2007 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable:  Baseline statutory tax rates, time t  Baseline average tax rates, time t 
CA * RR (t-1) -0.1086*** -0.069*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) 
CA 0.067** 0.048** 
 (0.03) (0.02) 
    
Controls Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.83 0.84 
Observations 2200 2200 
Notes: Standard errors are robust, clustered by state and year, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts 
*, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. All regressions include an intercept, and are estimated using OLS. The 
sample includes the 50 U.S. states and covers the period of 1963-2007. Dependent variable in Column 1 (2) is the baseline statutory 
(average) tax rates described in the text. ‘CA’ is the treatment measure described in the text. ‘RR’ is a dummy variable that includes 
the states that had some positive severance tax collections during treatment years (1980-1986); ‘NRR’ is a dummy variable that 
includes the remaining states. For the list of states included in each group see Appendix. All regressions include in addition the 
following controls (t-1): real per capita GSP, real per capita state expenditures, annual rate of change in state population, annual 
rate of change in real per capita capital stock, real per capita federal transfers to states. Where possible, explanatory variables are 
in natural logarithm form. For further information on variables see data Appendix. 
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Table 3: State tax rates and COWA, 1963-2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable:  Baseline statutory tax rates, time t  Baseline average tax rates, time t 
  
Complete 
Sample 
NRR: Resource 
poor states 
[Arellano-Bond] 
RR: Resource 
abundant states 
[Arellano-Bond] 
Complete 
Sample 
NRR: Resource 
poor states 
[Arellano-Bond] 
RR: Resource 
abundant states 
[Arellano-Bond] 
CA * NRR (t-1) 0.067** 0.023***   0.048** 0.013**   
 (0.03) (0.001)   (0.02) (0.005)   
CA * RR (t-1)  -0.041**   -0.024* -0.021**   -0.01* 
 (0.02)   (0.02) (0.01)   (0.01) 
Baseline statutory tax rates, (t-1)   0.91*** 0.91***      
   (0.01) (0.01)      
Baseline average tax rates, (t-1)         0.87*** 0.87*** 
         (0.02) (0.05) 
             
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes No No Yes No No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.83 n/a n/a 0.84 n/a n/a 
Observations 2200 792 1408 2200 792 1408 
Notes: Standard errors are robust, clustered by state and year, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of 
significance. All regressions include an intercept. Columns 1 and 4 (2-3 and 5-6) are estimated using OLS (Arellano-Bond estimator). General sample includes the 50 U.S. states and covers 
the period of 1963-2007; the sample in Columns 2-3 and 5-6 is restricted to NRR/RR states (described below). Dependent variable in Columns 1-3 (4-6) is the baseline statutory (average) 
tax rates described in the text. ‘CA’ is the treatment measure described in the text. ‘RR’ is a dummy variable that includes the states that had some positive severance tax collections during 
treatment years (1980-1986); ‘NRR’ is a dummy variable that includes the remaining states. For the list of states included in each group see Appendix. All regressions include in addition the 
following controls (t-1): real per capita GSP, real per capita state expenditures, annual rate of change in state population, annual rate of change in real per capita capital stock, real per 
capita federal transfers to states. Where possible, explanatory variables are in natural logarithm form. For further information on variables see data Appendix. 
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Table 4: State tax rates and COWA - disaggregation, 1963-2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   Statutory tax rates, time t  Average tax rates, time t 
Dependent 
variable: 
Top corporate 
tax rate 
Top income 
tax rate 
Sales tax 
rate 
Average 
corporate tax 
rate 
Average 
income tax 
rate 
Average 
sales tax 
rate 
CA * NRR (t-1) -0.06 0.06** 0.13*** -0.09 0.18*** 0.09*** 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) 
CA * RR (t-1)  -0.08** 0.04 0.03 -0.21** 0.11* 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.09) (0.06) (0.03) 
             
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.81 0.86 0.91 0.88 0.78 0.92 
Observations 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 
Notes: Standard errors are robust, clustered by state and year, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to 
a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. All regressions include an intercept, and estimated via OLS. The sample includes the 50 U.S. states and covers the 
period of 1963-2007. The dependent variable in Columns 1-3 (4-6) is the statutory (average) corporate/income/sales tax rates described in the text. ‘CA’ is 
the treatment measure described in the text. ‘RR’ is a dummy variable that includes the states that had some positive severance tax collections during 
treatment years (1980-1986); ‘NRR’ is a dummy variable that includes the remaining states. For the list of states included in each group see Appendix. All 
regressions include in addition the following controls (t-1): real per capita GSP, real per capita state expenditures, annual rate of change in state 
population, annual rate of change in real per capita capital stock, real per capita federal transfers to states. Where possible, explanatory variables are in 
natural logarithm form. For further information on variables see data Appendix. 
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Table 5: State spending and COWA, 1963-2007 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable, time t (all in 
real per capita terms): 
Total 
expenditure 
Transpor-
tation 
Welfare Health Education Safety 
CA * NRR (t-1) 0.048** 0.069** 0.135** -0.03 0.009 -0.21 
 (0.02) (0.03) 0.07 (0.07) (0.05) (0.13) 
CA * RR (t-1)  0.03 0.037* 0.04 -0.07 0.06 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.36 0.32 0.17 0.04 0.16 0.07 
Observations 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 
Notes: Standard errors are robust, clustered by state and year, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 
10, 5 and 1% level of significance. All regressions include an intercept, and estimated via OLS. The sample includes the 50 U.S. states and covers the period of 
1963-2007. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the real per capita state government expenditure in the categories outlined in each column. 
‘CA’ is the treatment measure described in the text. ‘RR’ is a dummy variable that includes the states that had some positive severance tax collections during 
treatment years (1980-1986); ‘NRR’ is a dummy variable that includes the remaining states. For the list of states included in each group see Appendix. All 
regressions include in addition the following controls (t-1): real per capita GSP, real per capita state expenditures, annual rate of change in state population, 
annual rate of change in real per capita capital stock, real per capita federal transfers to states. Where possible, explanatory variables are in natural logarithm 
form. For further information on variables see data Appendix. 
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Table 6: State tax rates and COWA - robustness, 1963-2007 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable:  Baseline 
statutory tax rates, time t 
Dynamic setting 
[Arellano-Bond] 
Shorter 
sample 
Three period 
framework 
State 
division: 
NRR no z 
State division: 
RR dominance 
1980 
excluded 
Equal COWA 
expenditures 
CA * NRR (t-1) 0.01** 0.05** 0.12*** 0.06** 0.06** 0.07** 0.08** 
 (0.006) (0.024) (0.009) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
CA * RR (t-1) -0.002** -0.03* -0.01** -0.04* -0.15*** -0.04* -0.03* 
 (0.001) (0.03) (0.005) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) 
Baseline statutory tax rates, (t-1) 0.96***       
 (0.009)       
         
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared n/a 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.82 
Observations 2200 1400 150 2200 2200 2150 2200 
Notes: Standard errors are robust, clustered by state and year, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. 
All regressions include an intercept. Column 2-7 (1) are estimated using OLS (Arellano-Bond estimator). The general sample includes the 50 U.S. states and covers the period of 1963-2007; in 
Column 2 the period is 1970-1996; Column 3 averages the sample to three periods: pre-treatment, treatment, and post-treatment; in Column 6 1980 is excluded. The dependent variable is the 
baseline statutory tax rate described in the text. ‘CA’ is the treatment measure described in the text. ‘NRR’ is a dummy variable that includes the states that had no severance tax collections 
during all sample years (Column 4) or during treatment years (Columns 1-3 and 6-7), or states categorized as resource poor (Column 5). ‘RR’ is a dummy variable that includes the remaining 
states. For the list of states included in each group see Appendix. All regressions include in addition the following controls (t-1): real per capita GSP, real per capita state expenditures, annual 
rate of change in state population, annual rate of change in real per capita capital stock, real per capita federal transfers to states. Where possible, explanatory variables are in natural logarithm 
form. For further information on variables see data Appendix. 
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Table 7: State tax rates and pre-COWA -- placebo test, 1963-2007 
  (1)  (2) (3) 
Dependent variable:  Baseline statutory 
tax rates, time t 
NRR: no z, pre-
CA-years 
NRR: no z, 
all sample 
RR 
dominance 
pre-CA * NRR (t-1) -0.002 -0.007 -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.01) (0.002) 
pre-CA * RR (t-1)  -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0005 
  (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.82 
Observations 2200 2200 2200 
Notes: Standard errors are robust, clustered by state and year, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. 
Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. All regressions include an intercept, and estimated 
via OLS. General sample includes the 50 U.S. states and covers the period of 1963-2007. The dependent variable is the 
baseline statutory tax rates. ‘pre-CA’ is the placebo treatment described in the text. ‘NRR’ is a dummy variable that includes 
the states that had no severance tax collections during pre-treatment-years, 1972-1979 (Column 1) or over the whole sample 
period (Column 2), or states categorized as resource poor (Column 3). ‘RR’ is a dummy variable that includes the remaining 
states. For the list of states included in each group see Appendix. All regressions include in addition the following controls (t-
1): real per capita GSP, real per capita state expenditures, annual rate of change in state population, annual rate of change in 
real per capita capital stock, real per capita federal transfers to states. Where possible, explanatory variables are in natural 
logarithm form. For further information on variables see data Appendix. 
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Table A1: COWA and estimated reduction 
in domestic oil production 
Year 
Million 
barrels 
Share of oil 
output 
1980 294 7.9 
1981 310 8.3 
1982 232 6.2 
1983 164 4.4 
1984 161 4.2 
1985 114 3.0 
1986 0 0 
1980-1986 1268 4.8 
The table presents the estimated drop in domestic oil 
production, in millions of barrels and as share of total oil 
output, due to the 1980 Crude Oil Windfall Act, under 
the assumption that the price elasticity of oil supply is 0.8 
(Source: Lazari (2006)).  
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Table A2: Federal spending and COWA, U.S.-level time-series analysis, 1963-2007 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable: 
Real federal spending, 
at time t, on: 
Energy 
Regional 
development 
Transpor-
tation 
Income and 
social security 
Housing Education 
Health and 
Medicare 
National 
defense 
Others 
COWA, (t-1) 0.44*** 0.16* 0.13** 0.05** -0.44 0.23 0.07 0.73 0.28 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.02) (0.41) (0.19) (0.49) (0.86) (0.31) 
           
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.68 0.42 0.93 0.73 0.15 0.77 0.96 0.67 0.77 
Observations 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Notes: Standard errors are robust, and appear in parentheses for independent variables. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. The sample pertains to the U.S. and 
covers the period of 1963-2007. All regressions include an intercept, a time trend, real per capita U.S. GDP (t-1), the real federal revenues net of those from CA (t-1), and the real federal expenditures 
net of those represented by the dependent variable (t-1). ‘COWA’ is the real annual federal tax receipts collected under the 1980 Crude Oil Windfall Act during 1980-1986. The dependent variable is 
real federal spending in the categories outlined in the table; ‘Others’ category is an aggregate of the following sub-groups: International affairs, Science, Agriculture, Justice, General Government, and 
Allowances. Data retrieved from the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. 
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics -- U.S. time-series 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Real federal spending on energy (Million $) 7263.71 7657.392 10.7888 31761.3 
Real federal spending on regional development (Million $) 15387.3 9280.487 3180.06 57769.4 
Real federal spending on transportation (Million $) 46675.3 13944.52 25462.6 77635.1 
Real federal spending on income and social security (Million $) 544012 261009.6 139053 983197 
Real federal spending on housing (Million $) 16693.5 21982.37 343.49 111148 
Real federal spending on education (Million $) 58113.7 23678.59 8077.56 125670 
Real federal spending on health and Medicare (Million $) 100129 83402.42 8038.78 275074 
Real federal spending on 'others' (Million $) 104762 21127.84 69876.3 155233 
Real federal spending on national defense (Million $) 379835 79652.27 272297 569246 
U.S. real per capita GDP  28558.1 12491.11 9187.27 49661.3 
Real annual collections from COWA (Million $) 1738.51 4862.456 0 23252 
Real federal revenues net of those from COWA (Million $) 1196658 775746.7 80939.4 2786579 
Notes: Figures are in 2009 prices. 
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Table A4: Descriptive statistics, RR vs. NRR states -- main, state-level, panel 
 RR states NRR states 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Real per capita GSP 30567.24 10729.60 11351.48 110866 32550.13 11230.95 11833.68 71982.8 
Real COWA collections, 1980-1986 (Million $) 11176.14 6825.18 2251 23252 11176.14 6825.18 2251 23252 
Real state-specific federal expenditures per capita (net of 
transfers and payments to individuals), 1980-1986 (Thousand $) 
0.687 0.422 0.149 2.120 0.677 0.462 0.082 2.151 
Treatment effect (CA) -- COWA-driven real state-specific federal 
expenditures per capita (net of transfers and payments to 
individuals), 1980-1986 (Thousand $) 
0.041 0.032 0.006 0.146 0.038 0.026 0.005 0.137 
Real per capita federal transfers to state governments 577.97 529.70 34.76 3916.77 564.92 489.71 27.20 2481.86 
Real per capita state government expenditure 3419.98 2045.92 873.63 17485.5 3631.17 1640.23 852.14 8416.28 
Annual rate of change in real per capita capital stock 0.02 0.03 -0.07 0.42 0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.31 
Annual rate of change in population 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.10 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.10 
Baseline statutory tax rates 0.05 0.02 0 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.004 0.14 
Baseline average tax rates 0.02 0.007 0.005 0.05 0.030 0.007 0.009 0.05 
Average corporate tax rates 0.003 0.003 0 0.04 0.004 0.002 0 0.01 
Average income tax rates 0.01 0.009 0 0.04 0.02 0.009 0 0.03 
Average sales tax rates 0.03 0.01 0.003 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.007 0.05 
Top corporate tax rate 0.05 0.03 0 0.12 0.07 0.03 0 0.12 
Top income tax rate 0.05 0.04 0 0.17 0.06 0.04 0 0.2 
Sales tax rate (statutory) 0.04 0.02 0 0.07 0.04 0.02 0 0.08 
Real per capita state government expenditure on education 1153.81 549.94 170.92 3871.36 1084.81 474.35 138.54 3628.70 
Real per capita state government expenditure on health 93.45 77.38 3.97 645.35 111.58 92.73 5.55 500.34 
Real per capita state government expenditure on transportation 392.24 226.41 123.96 2192.85 328.04 126.63 110.40 866.01 
Real per capita state government expenditure on public welfare 565.09 395.95 43.23 2549.25 686.67 489.63 65.86 2507.59 
Real per capita state government expenditure on public safety 70.76 71.49 2 463.52 79.79 75.62 3 428.67 
Notes: Figures are in 2009 prices. See Appendix for detailed description of variables. The ‘RR’ group includes the states that had some positive severance tax collections during treatment years (1980-
1986); The ‘NRR’ group includes the remaining states. 
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